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Ermir I. Hajdini 
Albania’s Path to the EU  
“Caesar’s spouse not only has to be honest but also has to show that she is 
honest” 
Anonymous 
Introduction 
The European Union (EU) cannot just see itself as a global player1 
but has to show that it is one. Regional integration is a crucial test for 
the EU’s credibility of becoming a global player and the Western 
Balkan enlargement process is a great example. Put simply, any 
economic advantageous position has to be associated by political processes. 
Decisiveness is an attribute of leadership and the EU cannot be the 
“least common denominator” any more. The European Union took 
the pledge to enlarge at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, where 
Albania, as well as the other countries of the Western Balkan region 
were determined as potential candidates for EU-membership. The 
EUs decision can be associated with the growing stability throughout 
the region over the past years as well as the geopolitical importance 
of the region for the EU. 
Almost 15 years have passed since the Summit and the challenges 
have grown not only for the Western Balkan region, but also for the 
European Union. The credibility of the enlargement process – a 
crucial instrument of EU foreign policy – has lost its momentum. 
However, the “Berlin Process”, the initiative aimed at revitalizing the 
multilateral ties between the Western Balkans and EU Member States 
 
1  Online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/economy/20180703 
STO 07132/the-eu-s-position-in-world-trade-in-figures-infographic. 
 
Internet resources, last date of access: October 24, 2019. 
Ermir I. Hajdini 
2 
  
is showing increased efforts on the side of the EU. Further, since 
February 2018 Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, The Republic of 
Northern Macedonia and Kosovo were given a renewed European 
perspective with accession negotiations moving forward. In the words 
of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, it is “merit-based, each under different conditions 
and at its own pace, but with a strong commitment on the part of the 
EU to make this goal credible and finally become true.”2 
Given the Union’s general reluctance towards further enlargement per 
se, with the return of geopolitics in the old continent and emergence 
of transnational security threats, the region has entered into an 
uncertain phase, characterized by a general resistance to democratic 
reform processes, lack of trust and other potential partnerships 
forming (e.g. Turkey, Russia, China and the Gulf Countries). The 
Union’s general political climate does not allow pushing the 
enlargement process. This is also based on the resurgence of populist 
movements and nationalism. Even though the Western Balkans in 
principle are not yet ready to become Member States, the need to keep 
them “anchored” to the EU goes beyond particular political parties or 
Member States’ interests and is firmly linked to the overall security 
and stability of the European continent. 
As such the accession negotiations should be seen as a promising 
development for a region that needs to leave behind unrestrained 
conflicts, cycles of external and internal oppression, dysfunctional 
state structures, underdevelopment, as well as an impoverished 
citizenry and issues of depopulation. However, the new European 
perspective is only the beginning of a long and challenging task for 
the region. For years, the EU has been involved in a variety of 
interventions within the WB with mixed results. Past failures can be 
 
2  Speech by High Representative/ Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the European 
Parliament Plenary Session on the Western Balkan Strategy, online at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39451/Speechhigh-
representativevic%20e-president-federica-mogherini-european-parliamentplenary_ 
en. 
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primarily found with governance structures, which prevented 
essential reforms from being implemented at the national level. 
Questions that need to be addressed include:  
1)  What the EU is “missing” if the EU family is not complete? 
2)  What are the short-term expectations of Albania vis à vis the EU? 
Here, the “Berlin Process” is worth mentioning3 – the brain child of 
Chancellor Angela Merkel is a cooperation platform designed to 
advance the Western Balkan states on their way to the European 
Union. The “Berlin Process” since its conceptualization in 2014 is 
becoming popular at the midst of Member States of the EU. The 
foundation of the initiative is the economic cooperation with 
emphasis given to the concept of regional economic cooperation – 
regional free trade area and infrastructure issues. 
Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans has recently entered a 
new stage of development, after the initial external (EU) driven phase. 
Originally, cooperation was conceived of secondary importance with 
respect to other EU priorities for the region i.e. rule of law, security, 
etc. As such, the entry into force of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements between the EU and the Western Balkan countries 
sanctioned the obligation for them to cooperate with each other in 
respect of the principle of good neighborly relations. It is worth 
mentioning that the agreement reached within the framework of the 
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), which lowered the roaming 
tariffs4 throughout the Western Balkan states, showed that the region 
can work together and produce good results for its citizens. 
  
 
3  Online at: https://berlinprocess.info/. 
4  Online at: https://www.rcc.int/news/551/roaming-prices-drastically-drop-across-
western-balkans-speak-more-surf-more-pay-less. 
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EU: The Need to reinvent itself 
The current state of affairs in the EU is not the most favorable or 
proactive in regards to enlargement policy. Following the feelings of 
“enlargement fatigue” of the Juncker’s Commission and the 
“migration crisis” and related issues along the Balkan route, the 
general perception in the region was one of increased insecurity and 
EU disengagement in the region. The challenges of the enlargement 
process are multifaceted and are deep-rooted, on the EU level and the 
national/ regional level: 
a) The EU level 
 Tensions between Member States and EU leadership (the 
Institutions) 
 EU financial sustains 
b) National/ regional level 
 Weak institutions 
 Wide spread corruption 
 Economic fatigue 
 Profit driven political elite 
 Yet to be impartial/ professional bureaucracy…etc. 
However, some of the challenges confronting the Western Balkans 
are the same challenges faced by the EU, including the fight against 
transnational organized crime, the management of migration flows, 
ensuring energy security or the security of citizens in general. Today’s 
threats do not respect national borders. It is not idealism that leads 
populations in Serbia or Albania to seek to bind themselves with other 
Europeans. It is realism and a recognition of mutual interests. Almost 
one year ago, High Representative/ Vicw-President Federica 
Mogherini presented, and EU Heads of State and Government 
endorsed, the EU Global Strategy. The Global Strategy recognizes 
that citizens want a stronger, more secure Europe, yet it also 
recognizes that the countries of Europe do not have the strength or 
resources to seize the opportunities or address the threats of the 21st 
century alone.  
Albania‘s Path to EU 
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Albania’s expectations 
“The European Union’s integration is a major national objective” – 
this is a strategic prerogative familiar to Albanians for almost 30 years 
now.5 As the matter of fact, Albanians have been and still are among 
the EU enthusiast and fierce supporters of the integration process. 
In order to get some perspective, the country, nowadays, is most 
famous for its justice sector reform – most often referred “vetting 
process”. This specific reform is unique as it has the blessing and 
support of European Union6 and the United States, the monitoring 
body of such reform is chaired by an EU official, and its objective is 
very much desired by the Albanian society at large.  
Based on the latest statement of Genoveva Ruíz Calavera – 
Chairwoman of the International Monitory Operation for the “vetting 
process” as well as Director for the Western Balkans at the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighborhood and 
Enlargement Negotiations – “…the reform is well on its way…” but 
still to see some hard cases brought up to courts, the country public 
opinion is craving for this. Thus achieving results on this – hampering 
the wide spread corruption – is a clear expectation of Albanians. 
Opening negotiations are expected to last eight to ten years, and 
during this time, structural reforms need to take place, including in 
Digital Integration and mobility (infrastructure). Albania still has a lot 
of work ahead in various fields with the support of the EU.7 
  
 
5  INSTAT of Albania (2010), Population of Albania on 1 January 2018 (in Albanian), 
Institute of Statistics of Albania. 
6  Online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/20144/most-frequently-asked-
questions-international-monitoring-operation_en. 
7  Alix Culbertson, Albania and Bosnia fail to impress at EU membership meeting over 
democratic value concerns, in: Express Newspapers Ltd., UK, 01.02.2017. 
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Conclusion 
In the era of austerity of anti-multilateralism and populist nationalism, 
this is no time to have a European Union on the block unsure about 
its future. Inevitably the Western Balkan’s Region vis à vis Albania’s 
integration to the EU is a safe bet. The timeline of integration will 
however depend on the political circumstances faced by the EU and 
the credibility of the structural reforms made by Albania. 
This essay argued in favor of a stronger and more decisive EU policy 
over individual Member’s State policies. Of course, the Western 
Balkan Region presents – as explained above – a huge challenge. On 
the other hand, that challenge represents an indispensable investment 
opportunity for the EU, with attributes both (geo) political and 
economic. 
The “Berlin Process” is not only a testimony to the “EU is strong 
here” but may also serve as a mean to “calcify” a coalition of 
willingness among its Member States. Albania is determined to 
continue the EU path and its citizens are very much in favor of the EU 
enlargement. These two crucial issues, especially as nationalistic 
elements are on the rise, must be important for the EU and must count 
for: 
 A fully functional rule of law state; 
 Structural Reforms.  
These are what Albanians expect from EU and vice versa, a paradox 
that EU must tackle. 
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Nikola Jokić 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the EU Path – 
Gains and Expectations 
Introduction 
At the Thessaloniki summit in 2003, the European Union (EU) 
confirmed its determination to continue the process of enlargement 
by confirming membership perspectives for the countries of the 
Western Balkans. This included, including Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) which, during the 1990s, experienced the most tragic war on 
European soil after World War II. However, with each round of 
enlargement, parties in the process, although they have fulfilled 
formal conditions, have developed different expectations from each 
other. As far as the EU or member states are concerned, the question 
that arises is related to the actual gains for the EU from having 
additional member states. On the other hand, people in accession 
countries have developed certain expectations of the EU during the 
accession process. Having this in mind, this paper discusses the case 
of BiH’s accession taking into account the following two questions: 
What expectations has BiH developed towards the EU during the 
accession process and what can the membership of BiH in the EU 
bring to the EU? 
Expectations of BiH towards the EU 
The EU became engaged in the crisis in Yugoslavia in the beginning 
of the 1990s with the aim of preventing the escalation of the conflict. 
At the beginning of the crisis, many people in BiH believed that 
Europe would not permit a war to occur on its doorstep. 
Unfortunately, the EU was not prepared to deal with such a crisis and 
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the Balkans sunk into a series of wars. The bloodiest of which 
happened in BiH, taking around 100.000 lives 1  and leaving the 
country in ruins. People’s hopes and beliefs that Europe would 
prevent such tragedy vanished in the whirlwind of the war.  
However, following the end of the war the EU has taken the leading 
role in reconstruction, stabilization and development of BiH. Since 
the EU confirmed a membership perspective, BiH has implemented 
many reforms in order to comply with the EU criteria. In the 
meantime, the EU has continued to support BiH, which can be seen 
best in the fact that the EU is the largest donor in BiH.2 Despite the 
EU’s support, BiH lags behind other Western Balkans countries on its 
path toward the EU. There are various reasons behind the slow 
progress that can be attributed to local actors, but at the same time, 
there are reasons for it on the side of the EU as well. In this regard, 
the EU’s reluctance for further enlargement has effected the progress 
BiH has made towards accession to the EU.3 Simultaneously with the 
increase in reluctance within the EU, stagnation in reforms in BiH has 
become more than obvious. This confirms the EU’s transformative 
power. However, the transformative power of the EU has limited 
impact due to reluctance on the EU side for further enlargement. The 
EU assistance to BiH in forms of donor aid as well as several 
initiatives to move the country closer to the EU has failed to deliver 
expected results due to a lack of a credible perspective of 
membership. The lack of clear timeline to membership has 
contributed to the overall stagnation of the country. Apart from the 
EU, there are several other power centers involved in BiH with the 
 
1  United Nations, UN News, online at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/08/1017272. 
2  Donor Mapping Report 2017, Ministry of Finance and Treasury of BiH, pp 8, online 
at: http://www.donormapping.ba/pdf/DMR_2017_ENG.pdf. 
3  Daria Sito-Sucic, Short-sighted policies stall Balkans’ integration into EU: Erdogan, 
Reuters, 24.10.2019, online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-
southeasteurope-forum/short-sighted-policies-stall-balkans-integration-into-eu-
erdogan-idUSKCN1U41KR. 
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aim to support peace implementation.4 There is no doubt that the 
responsibility for the overall progress of the country remains with 
local actors. However, the role of external actors in the reform process 
in BiH, as well as overall progress toward EU membership, must not 
be underestimated. The rise of the impact of different power centers 
in BiH is the result of Europe’s reluctance to admit BiH under its roof. 
Despite these influences, BiH belongs to Europe and that is why the 
transformative power of the EU remains. At same time, BiH has 
expected a greater presence from the EU in order to resist these 
different influences.  
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that political leaders of different 
communities in BiH are divided on many issues. The most recent 
example is a lack of an agreement with regard to forming a new 
government on the state level due to a division over the issue of BiH’s 
accession to NATO. 5  Furthermore, the involvement of different 
power centers in BiH creates further division among political leaders 
due to different historical reasons and relations between these power 
centers and different communities in BiH.  
However, all domestic actors welcome the EU’s presence and the EU 
path for BiH is a policy which enjoys broad support in BiH. 
Furthermore, according to the most recent public opinion poll, 76 % 
of people would vote yes for BiH’s entry into the EU.6 Relating to 
this, the expectations of people in BiH in terms of the EU are 
extremely high. Accession of BiH to the EU is primarily seen as a 
guaranty of peace and stability and an insurance that events from the 
recent history will not to be repeated. People in BiH are aware of this 
 
4  See Office of the High Representative, Peace Implementation Council, online at: 
http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1220. 
5  Emma Beswick, Why is Bosnia still without a government 10 months after elections? 
Euronews, 24.10.2019, online at: https://www.euronews.com /2019/08/21/why-is-
bosnia-still-without-a-government-10-months-after-elections-euronews-answers. 
6  Directorate for European Integration, Opinion poll: Citizen’s opinion on EU 
membership and EU integration process, April 2019, online at: 
http://www.dei.gov.ba/dei/media_servis/istrazivanje/default.aspx?id=1905&langTa
g=en-US&template_id=120&pageIndex=1. 
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fact and that is why most of them consider, “belief that membership 
guarantees lasting peace and political stability”, as the most common 
reason for supporting BiH membership in the EU.7  
On the other side, the EU proudly promotes itself as a “soft power” 
and emphasizes diversity. People of Europe, “united in diversity”, 
have come together to work for peace and prosperity.8 Such diversity 
can be observed from various perspectives, e.g. diversity of culture or 
language, but also diverse systems of government, from constitutional 
monarchies, federal republics to centralized republics or division of 
powers between different levels of governments. Deployment of these 
diversities in line with the principles of “soft power” used in a 
consistent manner by the EU’s would definitely unblock many 
processes in BiH. In this way, the EU would fulfil the expectations of 
people in BiH by helping them find their place under the EU roof. 
Another face of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
One of the main characteristics of BiH is its huge ethnic and religious 
diversity. Namely, BiH is a place where four major religious and 
many ethnic groups have coexisted throughout the history. It has been 
a home to Catholics, Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Judaism for 
centuries. In many cities in BiH, including the capital, Sarajevo, 
several centuries-old churches and mosques were built next to each 
other. Today, BiH consists of three constituent ethnic groups, 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Apart from them, BiH is home to many 
other ethnic groups. All these diversities make BiH a unique place on 
the European map, a place where the East and the West meet. In spite 
of all this diversity, different ethnic groups in BiH have one thing in 
common and that is European identity. Such diversity in a relatively 
small space like Bosnia could seem problematic due to the tragic 
 
7  Directorate for European Integration, Opinion poll: Citizen’s opinion on EU 
membership and EU integration process, April 2019, pp 8. 
8  European Union, The EU moto, online at: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/symbols/motto_en. 
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recent historical events during which many war crimes were 
committed. However, there is another side of BiH, which reflects the 
real “face” of the people in BiH which was shown many times in the 
past, through heroic acts of the people in BiH who risked their lives 
during dark episodes of Bosnian history. With their heroic acts, these 
people stood against the most brutal terror being done to their fellow 
citizens whose lives were threatened only because of their ethnic or 
religious background. In saving their fellow citizens, these heroes 
made it clear that the most horrible acts against human rights are not 
in line with their culture and beliefs.  
In this regard, it is worth mentioning one of the most prominent 
examples in the recent history, which relates to Srđan Aleksić. At the 
peak of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s, Srđan 
Aleksić lost his life while defending his neighbor who was attacked 
because of his ethnicity.9 Along from this example, there are many 
similar cases in the last war among different ethnic groups, in which 
people saved “others”, whose lives were threatened just because of 
their ethnicity.10  
Furthermore, there were many similar cases during World War II. The 
best testimony for these heroic acts is that the people from BiH were 
awarded with “Righteous Among the Nations” award by Yad Vashem 
– The World Holocaust Remembrance Centre.11 Apart from saving 
the lives of others, people in BiH risked their own lives to save 
cultural heritage artifacts during World War II.  
One such example is the Sarajevo Haggadah, a valuable manuscript 
from the 14th century of great emotional significance for the Jewish 
community. The Sarajevo Haggadah has survived dark episodes 
 
9  Human Rights House Foundation, Srdjan Aleksic posthumously awarded, online at: 
https://humanrightshouse.org/articles/srdjan-aleksic-posthumously-awarded/. 
10  See: Story about a Man who saved 45 Serbian Civilians only 3 Days after His Family 
was burned, Sarajevo Times, online at: https://www.sarajevotimes .com/story-man-
saved-45-serbian-civilians-3-days-family-burned/. 
11  Yad Vashem, World Holocaust Remembrance Center, Names of Righteous by 
Country, online at: https://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/statistics.html. 
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thanks to the courage of individuals who risked their lives regardless 
of their own religious believes.12 Today, the manuscript is exhibited 
in the National Museum in Sarajevo and represents valuable piece of 
BiH cultural heritage.  
However, let us forget for a moment the dark periods of BiH history 
and have a look at some bright episodes. Namely, a mixture of 
different cultures has proven to be a great potential for attracting the 
attention of international circles in a positive manner. For example, 
soon after the country came under Austro-Hungarian rule, BiH 
recorded great results in the field of technological innovation. 
Namely, Sarajevo was among the first European cities, to introduce 
the electric tram.13 During the period of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, BiH developed significant economic relations with the 
countries of the European Community. In this regard, it is worth 
remembering that several famous European brands have had their 
factories in BiH.14 
One of the brightest moments in which the diversity of BiH came to 
the fore was recorded in 1984. Sarajevo especially, as a host of the 
XIV Olympic Winter Games was the focus of an international 
audience. The ambitious idea to host one of the most prestigious 
sporting events was a mixture of creativity and enthusiasm of the 
people in BiH. Although it seemed almost impossible to win the 
nomination to host the games, against cities with much more 
developed facilities and a longer history in winter sports, Sarajevo 
won. This event was significant as not a single national team 
boycotted the games, as was the case with several other Olympic 
 
12  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO, France 
and the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina bring Sarajevo Haggadah close 
to the public, online at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/member-states/single-view/ 
news/unesco_france_and_the_national_museum_of_bosnia_and_herzego/. 
13  Emily Gunzburger Makaš, Tanja Damljanović Conley, Capital Cities in the 
Aftermath of Empires: Planning in Central and Southeastern Europe, Routledge, 
2010 pp 243. 
14   VOLKSWAGEN, Vergessen und verzeihen, online at: https://www.spiegel.de/ 
spiegel/print/d-7971702.html. 
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games during the 1980s.15 In the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, 
this was a great achievement and Sarajevo showed that it could bridge 
divided nations in Europe.  
After the ’90s war, the city of Sarajevo was divided into two cities, 
Sarajevo and East Sarajevo. However, the “flame of peace” returned 
to both cities for the first time as a result of common efforts to shine 
again on the international stage. Namely, Sarajevo and East Sarajevo 
were hosts to the European Youth Olympic Festival (EYOF) in 
2019.16  
During the 1980’s BiH established itself as a cultural center of the 
former Yugoslavia, especially in the field of music and films. One of 
the most prominent subcultural movements in the former Yugoslavia, 
the “New Primitives” was created during this time as a response to 
socio-economic developments in the former Yugoslavia. 
Simultaneously, as in the music scene, cinematography was 
flourishing and today one of the most prominent film festivals in 
South Eastern Europe takes place in Bosnia – Sarajevo Film 
Festival. 17  Everything mentioned here, proves the achievements 
resulting from huge diversity. Additionally, if looked at from an 
historical perspective, these diversities in BiH have shown that their 
greatest potential is reached when they were a part of larger, grandiose 
projects. In this regard, BiH’s membership in the EU could be 
beneficial for both sides.   
 
15  John Nauright, Charles Parrish, Sports Around the World: History, Culture, and 
Practice, Jørn Hansen, Olimpic Winter Games of 1984 (Sarajevo), pp 406. 
16  European Youth Olympic Festival, online at: https://eyof2019.net/ 
en/stranica.php?idstranica=8. 
17  European Commission, Film Forum Sarajevo looks at how to boost the presence of 
European films in South-Eastern Europe, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/news/film-forum-sarajevo-looks-how-boost-presence-european-
films-south-eastern-europe. 
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Conclusion 
Diversity in BiH has proven its potential many times through 
numerous bright episodes in history. The accession of BiH to the EU 
should not only be observed as an accession of one more member but 
as a gain in the form of huge potential to contribute to common 
European interests.  
On the other side, the people in BiH expect more support from Europe 
in BiH in order to overcome their fears from the recent past and find 
their place under the roof of the EU. Not so long time ago they 
believed that Europe would not let them down, but Europe was not 
prepared at the time to meet their longings and expectations. In spite 
of that, people in BiH still believe in Europe and hope that they will 
not be let down again. 
     15 
 
Teodora Lađić 
Western Balkans and the EU – Montenegro’s 
View 
1. What is the EU missing if we do not complete the 
EU family by bringing Montenegro into the EU? 
The European Council adopted the Thessaloniki agenda for Western Balkans 
in 2003, which introduced a whole set of new criteria and cooperation 
frameworks between the European Union (EU) and the Western Balkan six 
countries (WB6). Montenegro officially started the negotiation process with 
the EU in 2012, in a new enlargement process with a vast complex of 
accession criteria. Now, seven years of negotiations later, 32 out of 33 
negotiation chapters have been opened and only three are provisionally 
closed. This year’s European Commission Report1 provides an assessment 
of the progress made, recognizing results made during the reporting period 
in many fields. Currently, Montenegro is waiting on the green light to open 
the last Chapter 8 – competition policy, for obtaining closing benchmarks 
for Chapters 23 and 24 and to temporarily close several chapters that have 
attained internal readiness. Even though, Montenegro has harmonized its 
institutional and legislative framework with the EU, the implementation still 
represents the most demanding phase of the accession process with the EU. 
There is still a lot of work ahead of Montenegro and it is important that the 
perspective of membership exists, as the reform process in Montenegro 
would not continue in this manner if the goal of EU membership had not 
been the driving force. Nevertheless, we cannot influence the processes 
 
1  European Commission, Staff Working document, Montenegro 2019 report, 
Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions 2019, Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 29 May 
2019. 
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within the Union, but what we can do – is to continue with our reform 
activities and direct all capacities towards improving conditions in the 
Montenegrin society, because in the end the reform process is conducted for 
us, not the EU.  
On the other hand, the EU is currently in a phase of consolidation, the 
elections for European Parliament have passed surprisingly well, in that 
euro-skeptic parties acquired fewer seats than expected. However, the 
fragmentation among pro-European parties is higher than ever before. 
Moreover, the Brexit situation is still an unresolved matter, with numerous 
international issues where the EU has no united stance. Hence, taking all of 
this into consideration the European Union needs to make use of its most 
successful policy – enlargement policy, as the backbone of unity, prosperity 
and as a tool for sharing the unprecedented European peace mission 
throughout diverse regions of Europe.  
Throughout history, Montenegro has shown incredible signs of stability in 
the region and has supported common European values. The EU would 
certainly miss a chance to import stability and would create enormous 
negative effects in the whole region if it closes the door to further 
enlargement, and which in the end, would return to as boomerang. It is clear 
that the EU has doubts about accepting new member states, i.e. Montenegro, 
as we can see in the recent survey conducted by Eurobarometer2 which 
shows that the majority of the EU member states and their citizens have a 
low level of support for the enlargement process at this time. This would 
imply that the EU’s soft power in the enlargement process is losing value 
and it is not attaining its prior purpose, which in the end would directly affect 
the EU’s ability to export stability, prosperity and security and certainly 
would question its role in the international sphere. Hence, the Balkan 
Peninsula remains a stumbling stone for the European Union; nevertheless, 
it is the moment to learn from previous mistakes. Montenegro is a small 
country in land size, population and overall economy, mere entrance into the 
European family would not statistically change much at the Union level. 
 
2  European Commission, Eurobarometer, Public opinion, online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm#p=1&instruments=S
PECIAL. 
Western Balkans and the EU – Montenegro’s View 
17 
 
Moreover, taking into consideration the two major issues within accession 
negotiations with the EU, organized crime and corruption, under so called 
“balance clause” Chapters 23 and 24, in the end it would not threaten core 
European values. On the contrary, by entering the EU, Montenegro would 
have greater access to available internal mechanisms for timely and concrete 
action towards these issues. Hence, looking at this from a negative side, the 
EU has no reason to not welcome Montenegro as the next member state, 
considering the fact that many other EU countries still struggle with similar 
issues that can only be resolved with joint cooperation and support. The 
protracted enlargement process for the WB6 and especially for Montenegro 
has also affected the quality and speed of political, economic and legal 
reforms, which in the end have led to measurable democratic backsliding and 
ignorance amongst the political elite for the implementation of measures 
adopted through the negotiation process with the EU. This, consequently, 
can introduce interest from new global powers in this historically and 
geostrategically important European region. The influence of Russia, China 
and Turkey in Montenegro is visible through subversive actions or 
investments which could have significant repercussions on the European 
Union.3 
“Brussels faces the dilemma of accommodating different positions in its 
enlargement plans. Some credible commitment to the Western Balkans is necessary 
to strengthen the attractiveness of the European model, deal with external 
influences and, importantly, show the EU’s vitality after Brexit. The UK’s 
departure will have an impact on the EU’s redefinition of its global role and 
engagement with the Western Balkans is one of the ways to demonstrate Brussels’ 
willingness to remain a relevant actor. Enlargement remains a powerful mechanism 
in the EU’s foreign-policy toolbox. It allows the bloc to have considerable leverage 
over its neighborhood if the prospect of joining is credible. As seen with the recent 
efforts, the EU is aware of the Western Balkans’ importance and tries to make use 
of its tools to address regional concerns, mostly over security.”4  
 
3  Alex Eror, Who Would Really Benefit From a Freeze on EU Enlargement in the 
Balkans? World politics review, July 2019, online at: https://www. 
worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28037/who-would-really-benefit-from-a-freeze-
on-eu-enlargement-in-the-balkans. 
4  Anna Nadibaidze, Can EU enlargement in the western Balkans revive? Social 
Europe, January 2019, online at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/eu-enlargement-
western-balkans. 
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Hence, the EU would certainly affect its leading role in the world as a soft 
change maker and role model for conduct if it were not to accept Montenegro 
or other WB countries into the family of the EU member states. This also, 
indirectly explains what the EU would miss if it fails to bring Montenegro 
into the EU family.  
Moreover, the EU values of peace, democracy, freedom, respect for human 
rights and prosperity are the backbone of the unprecedented supranational 
system, which brings diverse countries and citizens under one united 
umbrella. This mission is not selective and it is intended to be expanded until 
the whole European continent is circled, thus closing the European doors to 
the WB6 would undermine the credibility of the whole European project. 
Montenegro is a country of unique harmony on the Balkan Peninsula when 
it comes to diverse nationalities, culture and religion. It has been home to 
many refugees during the ‘90s wars and it has shown persistence on the path 
towards Europeanization in the most difficult times. Moreover, throughout 
history, this small country, has given a significant contribution during two 
world wars, by always being on the right side of history. Finally, in the 
enlargement process it has shown good results in many fields, especially 
when it comes to good neighborhood relations, one of the new accession 
preconditions. Still, there is a lot of work ahead in the most sensitive areas 
for Montenegrin society, however, in my opinion, the European Union and 
Montenegro would gain much more if Montenegro joins the Union sooner 
rather than later. Additionally, Montenegro has shown a high level of 
solidarity and responsibility towards the EU and its member states in times 
of crisis, i.e. the migrant crisis and in international peacekeeping missions. 
It has proven its awareness of the necessity to respect the European values 
and to contribute to the attainment of EU objectives.  
“Advancing the EU-Western Balkans integration process could play an important 
role for the EU within ongoing efforts to improve its own resilience. This would 
help the Union to better define its relationship with an increasingly complex 
external environment. Moreover, it would not only be an investment in stability and 
security in Europe, but it would also be economically beneficial for both the 
Balkans and the entire EU. It is clear that any increase in the region’s living 
standards would positively contribute to the wealth of the Union. The successful 
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integration of the Western Balkans would represent an important step forward in 
the process of the territorialisation of the EU.”5 
In the end, it is important that the newly appointed European Commission 
and its President Ursula von der Leyen, do not repeat the mistake of the 
predecessor Jean-Claude Juncker when he proclaimed, at the beginning of 
his mandate, that no enlargement will happen during his term. This new 
institutional structure of the EU must give new impetus to consolidation 
within the Union; at the same time leaving the door wide open for potential 
new member states in the Balkan region. Thus, Western Balkan countries 
will never be the same as many Western European countries, but in the end, 
the motto “united in diversity” certainly explains why it is important to have 
us all on board. 
2. What do you and Montenegro expect from the EU in 
the next few years? 
The European integration process for Montenegro started in 2007 after the 
signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. Thus, 
calculating from this time, it is twelve years of conducting a plethora of 
reforms, harmonization with EU rules and following strict and measurable 
criteria. However, the integration process itself with the EU is Montenegrin’s 
wisest choice and it is a voluntary decision for the well-being, security and 
prosperity of Montenegrin citizens. In that respect it is impossible to cherry 
pick and choose only benefits of the process, but to accept the whole package 
meaning time-consuming processes, many changes and never-ending 
conditionality. It is certain that Montenegro and other Western Balkan 
countries would not make the advancements as they have done until this 
point, if t the EU was not seen as the driving force and paradigm on the other 
side of the process. The European Union has set a path in front of us many 
years ago and it is still providing Montenegro strong support in diverse 
manners to become a better place for its citizens. However, we still naturally 
expect more from the EU in the up-coming years especially taking into 
 
5  Matteo Bonomi, The EU and the Western Balkans: A Region of Opportunities, not 
only of Risks, January 2019, online at: http://greater-europe.org/ archives/6337. 
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consideration certain periods of crisis, in the EU and worldwide, that have 
eclipsed the enlargement agenda and led to significant fatigue among 
member states. This has prevented the EU to address the issues in the WB6 
concretely. In the end, we must ask ourselves what do we expect from us and 
not only from the EU, because it is up to Montenegro to conduct reforms in 
order to attain a certain level of development, i.e. the mere membership is 
not goal by itself, but the goal is or at least it should be the transformation of 
our society in terms of economic wealth, respect for human rights, strong 
institutions, rule of law and overall high living standards. We should 
understand that the expectations must be directed towards our institutions 
and people in terms that recognize that the reform process is only for us and 
that it is more important to make changes in our society than to formally 
become member of the EU. On the other hand, the EU has shown that it has 
opened eyes and opinion as to future of enlargement of the Union by 
reserving 46 seats in the European Parliament for the newcomers after Great 
Britain leaves. This is the most direct sign of an intention to show absorption 
capacity and readiness to accept Montenegro and other accession candidates. 
Certainly, Montenegro is seen as the first next EU member state and it is 
considered a frontrunner in the European integration process; 2025 has been 
set as the target year, nevertheless it can be prolonged if certain measurable 
results are not met. 
“Following the decision (The new rules that were formally adopted by EU leaders 
at their summit in Brussels on 28-29 June will come into force in time for the 
European elections to be held on 23-26 May in 2019.), 27 of the UK's 73 seats 
will be redistributed to other countries, while the remaining 46 seats will be kept 
for future enlargements. This means the number of MEPs to be elected will be 
705.”6 
Hence, the European Parliament elections have passed and left positive 
and pro-European forces in power, which are supportive of the 
enlargement process. At the same time, the level of fragmentation is 
 
6  The European Parliament announcement, EU elections: how many MEPs will each 
country get in 2019?, 2018, online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/ 
en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180126STO94114/eu-elections-how-many-meps-will-
each-country-get-in-2019; and The European Council Decision establishing the 
composition of the European Parliament, June 2018, online at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7-2018-REV-1/en/pdf. 
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higher than it has ever been in the Parliament, leaving strong doubts as to 
the smoothness of the decision-making process and achieving consensus 
on the accession process. 
Furthermore, the EU commitment to the enlargement agenda is also 
embodied in the pre-accession assistance support that each EU candidate 
country receives for conducting economic, political and social reforms 
within the European integration process. The next funding cycle under the 
Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027 has incorporated 
significant resources for the IPA funds and increased them by 13% 7 
compared to previous financial cycles, making space to fulfil expectations in 
the short-term strategy of the Montenegrin accession process with the EU. 
The increase of financial support from the EU is a positive sign, in that more 
resources will be available to boost reforms and support the most difficult 
challenges within specific negotiating chapters. On the other hand, this also 
means that the Montenegrin expectations, embodied in the midterm strategy 
(date for the accession confirmed) will not be met, i.e. increasing financial 
support under IPA funds strongly suggests the continuation of the 
Montenegrin candidate status as a negotiating country without signs of the 
end of the long-lasting accession process. According to the recent European 
Commission Progress Report for Montenegro there was neither suggestion 
for the opening the last unopened Chapter 8 – competition policy, nor 
recommendations to close those chapters that have achieved internal 
readiness.  
The next few years will be crucial for the Montenegrin accession process and 
it is necessary to consider the fact that, now more than ever, there will be no 
shortcuts towards full-fledged membership, as the newly elected members in 
the EU institutions will certainly put more emphasis on internal 
consolidation than on enlargement policy. This indicates that the European 
Commission will be stricter as to the results it wants to see from the 
Montenegro and other WB countries in reform processes. Hence, taking this 
into consideration, we must be prepared to expect nothing more or less than 
 
7  European Commission, The EU budget for the future, June 2018, online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-pre-
accession-assistance_en.pdf. 
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the EU has provided to us so far. More importantly, Montenegro has to think 
in farsighted terms and prepare for the future, i.e. it has to set clear plan for 
the years up to 2025 (as targeted year of accession). Thus, it needs to set 
achievable and measurable milestones in terms of the number of chapters 
that need to be closed, or fulfilling benchmarks for chapter 23 and 24, on 
which whole process depends. In this way, Montenegro must take the 
process into its hands.8 
Finally, EU enlargement policy is one of the most successful policies, which 
has really led to positive changes in many countries. However, it is clear that 
the current enlargement set-up has not resulted in the greatest progress in the 
Western Balkan region. If the EU wants to maintain its credibility and 
prevent other international actors from taking up firm positions in this region, 
it has to meet the expectations of these countries; in the same manner it 
expects from them to achieve certain accession conditions.9 
“The Western Balkans are part of Europe: we share the same history, the same 
geography, the same cultural heritage and the same opportunities and challenges 
today and in the future. We are each other’s destiny. So let there be no doubt that 
the place of the Western Balkans is inside the European Union.”10  
In the end, without any doubt the EU and Montenegro share at least two 
things in common, that is history and geography, with other mentioned 
aspects taken into consideration – it is certain that expectations are the same 
when it comes to Montenegro’s fully fledged membership in the Union. 
 
8  Gordana Djurovic, Interview, Portal Analitika, May 2019, online at: 
https://portalanalitika.me/clanak/335457/durovic-nakon-izbora-za-evropski-
parlament-nema-precica-za-zemlje-kanididate. 
9  Dusko Lopandic, Brexit and the Future of the EU Enlargement, European Policy 
Center, April 2017, online at: https://cep.org.rs/en/blogs/brexit-and-the-future-of-eu-
enlargement/. 
10  European Commission, Speech by Commissioner Johannes Hahn at the Western 
Balkans Summit, Poznań 2019, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/speech-commissioner-johannes-
hahn-western-balkans-summit-poznan-2019_en. 
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Ksenija Milenković 
The European Integration of Serbia in the 
Framework of the EU’s (un)successful 
Strategy for the Western Balkans 
The European perspective for the so-called Western Balkan region was 
initially designed in the late nineties of the 20th century, with the main aim 
of stabilizing a turbulent region which remained affected by conflicts, 
divisions and ethnic and religious partitions. The “Stabilization and 
Association” process was launched with the goal of offering the perspective 
of European Union membership to the region, as well as to contribute to 
peace and stability and encourage regional cooperation and reconciliation. 
The confirmation of the EU’s political commitment towards enlargement in 
the region came at the EU-Western Balkan summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, 
where all regional partners were promised an EU future, upon the fulfilment 
of the membership criteria. So far the only country which has joined the EU 
under the Stabilization and Association process was Croatia in 2013 after six 
years of accession negotiations. 
The perspective currently seems gloomy for the rest of the region. Although 
the enlargement process has been kept alive and on the agenda of the EU, 
the political commitment of the EU leaders is highly questionable. Since the 
so-called “big bang” enlargement of 2004, the enthusiasm for the process 
has continuously declined and the reasons for that trend can be observed both 
within and outside of the EU. The global political constellation has 
significantly changed, the world economic crisis of 2009 and geopolitical 
polarization resembling that of the Cold War period being the most 
illustrative examples. New global actors such as China, India and Turkey 
have emerged and imposed themselves as economic, geo-strategic or 
regional powers. In politics, far-right parties and movements have gained 
strength as they passionately advocate for the return of “traditional values” 
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embodied in conservativism, nationalism and skepticism. Recent regional 
conflicts with global implications, such as the one in Syria, have put the EU’s 
capability to act as a real global power to the test. The EU’s inability to reach 
consensus and effectively implement its own decisions on how to address 
the migration crisis was one of the main reasons for launching the debate on 
the future of the EU. 
Internally, the EU has demonstrated a lack of capacity to function 
effectively, which is mainly blamed on the new members from 2004 
onwards. Whether this is indeed the case or not falls under the realm of an 
academic debate, however this state of play has largely shaped the 
enlargement process since the initial enthusiasm of the early 2000s. After the 
EU came to the conclusion that large mistakes were made with previous 
enlargements, the European Commission came up with the so-called new 
approach to accession negotiations to be applied to all candidate countries 
after Croatia. The new approach basically means that the rule of law becomes 
the main focus of the accession negotiations and progress in that area or lack 
thereof determines the overall pace and the dynamics of the negotiations. 
Furthermore, the fulfillment of all membership criteria is scrutinized in a 
much stricter and less favorable way for the candidate countries.  
The final blow to the enlargement policy came with the migration crisis and 
Brexit. With these two imminent and by all means important and complex 
challenges, enlargement descended further down the ladder of EU political 
priorities. Therefore, the most successful policy since the foundation of the 
EU and the most effective use of European soft power seems to have lost its 
appeal. The most recent failure of the EU to agree to opening accession 
negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania makes Euro-enthusiasts in 
the Western Balkan region wonder which arguments they will use to justify 
the need to continue the European integration process in their respective 
countries. It will be difficult and, for the sake of facts, not fair to blame it 
entirely on the two candidates. How the lack of a positive decision will affect 
the EU’s credibility in the region remains to be seen in the forthcoming 
period, but it is safe to assume that Euro-skepticism will no longer be 
exclusively reserved for the citizens of the EU. 
The European Integration of Serbia in the Framework of the EU’s 
(un)successful Strategy for the Western Balkans 
25 
 
Given the entirety of circumstances, the European integration process of 
Serbia has been moderately successful. The accession negotiations were 
opened in the beginning of 2014 and Serbia has so far opened 17 out of 35 
negotiating chapters, two of which have been provisionally closed. Under 
the new approach, the European Commission reports to the member states 
every six months on progress in the area of the rule of law which significantly 
influences the decision to open further chapters. In the case of Serbia, the 
pace of the negotiations is also dependant on the normalization of relations 
with Pristina – Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia’s southern province which 
unilaterally declared independence in 2008. Serbia, as well as five EU 
member states, do not recognize the independence of Kosovo and Metohija 
but it has agreed to participate in the EU facilitated dialogue on the 
normalization of relations. The outcome of the dialogue, which according to 
the EU’s negotiating framework with Serbia should entail “comprehensive 
normalization of relations” on the basis of status neutral premise, is meant to 
contribute to the long term stability of the region. Serbia has so far 
demonstrated a high level of political and practical commitment to the 
dialogue by implementing the vast majority of agreements reached with 
representatives of Pristina under the auspices of the EU.  
In early 2018, the European Commission published the Credible 
Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans where Serbia and 
Montenegro were acknowledged as frontrunners of the accession process 
and likely the next two countries to join the EU. The strategy stated 2025 as 
the possible year for the next enlargement, provided that all membership 
criteria, with the focus on the reforms in the area of the rule of law, are 
successfully met. Member states took note of the strategy, however they gave 
it no clear and unequivocal political support. 2025 caused the most 
controversy, as it demonstrates a lack of willingness in some of the EU 
capitals to commit to a concrete outcome of accession negotiations. 
Although it remains a weak incentive for Serbia and other Western Balkan 
partners to continue with the European integration process, in reality the 
strategy was never truly implemented and only serves as a tool for the 
European Commission’s apparatus to come up with new and creative 
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initiatives to encourage some form of cooperation and partnership with the 
region. 
Popular support for the European integration process in Serbia has been 
steady at slightly above 50 % over the last couple of years, which is below 
the region’s average. Euro-skepticism is traditionally present in Serbia, 
although overall support has increased since the opening of accession 
negotiations, this is in stark contrast to its rapid decline after the historic 
maximum of around 70 % which was registered immediately after the EU 
granted Serbia visa liberalization in 2009. In relation to the EU, citizens of 
Serbia tend to demonstrate rather rational choices, choosing the EU for its 
living standard, mobility, educational opportunities. On the other hand, they 
are emotionally bond to countries such as Russia, perceiving it as a genuine 
friend due to its support of Serbia on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija. The 
influence of other non-EU actors such as China and Turkey is also ever more 
present, both in Serbia and in the rest of the region. The inability of the EU 
to live up to its promises and commitments to Serbia and the region 
irreversibly creates an open space for different influences making the efforts 
of other actors quite legitimate.  
In contrast to the marginal majority support of membership in the EU, the 
vast majority of Serbian citizens support reforms in all areas, with an 
emphasis on economic reforms, fight against corruption, independence of 
judiciary and reforms of the health and social security system. Such a high 
level of awareness of the importance of reforms for their own well-being 
demonstrates the maturity of the population which does not necessarily 
connect reforms to the membership in the EU. However, on the other hand, 
it also shows the level of disillusionment amongst the population with the 
process of European integration which in their opinion is taking too long and 
promises no concrete outcome. An additional reason for concern is the 
increasing Euro-skepticism of the youth in contrast to the middle-aged 
population, who are currently the greatest supporters of EU membership. 
Millennial youth, accustomed to a fast-paced approach to life in a digital era, 
is less willing to engage in a comprehensive and a long term process of 
European integration.  
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Serbia’s negative image, which prevailed in Western Europe throughout the 
nineties has made its European path more complex and difficult. In spite of 
the democratic transformation of Serbia in the early 2000s and its continuous 
efforts to contribute to the peace and stability of the region which is 
acknowledged by the EU, Serbia has constantly been put in the position of 
having to defend itself from the image of the regional troublemaker. Serbia 
has undoubtedly changed for the better, which does not mean that all criteria 
for the EU membership have yet been met. A lot still needs to be done in the 
framework of the reform processes, with an emphasis on the area of the rule 
of law. In the sense of the complexity of the rule of law reforms and their 
effects in the mid to long run in terms of implementation, the EU’s new 
approach to accession negotiations has demonstrated a positive impact. 
However, it needs to remain a strict but fair tool of assessment and judgment 
of actual reform results instead of an instrument for slowing down or 
blocking the accession negotiations. Serbia has entered the European 
integration process with full knowledge of the conditions and complete 
political willingness to engage in fulfilling the membership criteria and it 
seeks no shortcuts to the EU. The Serbian government fully supports the 
merit based approach of the EU for every candidate, as well as the individual 
progress of the candidates based on reform results. As a serious and a reliable 
candidate, Serbia expects the dynamics of the accession negotiations to 
reflect its actual progress.  
In spite of the fading enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans, 
Serbia remains committed to its European path. Simultaneously, Serbia will 
continue to foster peace and stability in the region together with enhanced 
regional cooperation which contributes to connectivity, economic 
cooperation and the mobility of citizens. Serbia’s most recent initiative to 
establish the so-called mini Schengen area with North Macedonia and 
Albania is aimed at lifting barriers to the freedom of movement of people, 
goods, services and capital between our three countries. At a later stage, such 
an area might be implemented in the entire Western Balkan region. This 
initiative represents the implementation of the core EU values, embodied in 
the four freedoms on the regional level and it emerged as the result of a 
genuine and authentic awareness within the region that such cooperation is 
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essentially necessary. Notwithstanding the political differences which 
undoubtedly exist on a number of issues between Serbia, North Macedonia 
and Albania. Given the current realities surrounding the enlargement policy 
of the EU, similar initiatives are likely to follow. They will not be a substitute 
for full membership in the EU but they represent a rational choice aimed at 
stronger and more effective cooperation within the region which in the future 
will have to rely more on its own capacity and resources. 
The future of the EU enlargement process is yet to be seen. The EU will have 
to prove the credibility of its promises to the region and the region will have 
to find strength and wisdom and continue its efforts on its European path. 
With all the options presented, there is still no credible alternative to the 
European integration process. On the other hand, the EU leaders need to 
consider modalities of addressing Euro-skepticism in their respective 
countries. Instead of succumbing to the blame game, where new members 
and candidate countries are the usual suspects for all internal problems of the 
EU, the leaders need to demonstrate their ability to address citizens’ concerns 
in a functional and effective manner. On their part, candidate countries need 
to overcome their rightful disappointment with the long running process and 
frequent lack of reward for their reform results and continue with reforms 
for the benefit of their own citizens. Hopefully the newly elected and 
appointed European institutions, though they have already encountered a 
rough pre-start to their mandate, will demonstrate creativity and enthusiasm 
for the enlargement process in spite of active attempts to make it reversible. 
In today’s world, the irreversibility of the enlargement process is in the 
interest of neither the candidate countries nor the EU. 
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Denis Preshova 
Missing the Carrots? North Macedonia’s 
thorny Path to EU Accession Negotiations 
“The European Union’s transformative power”, has been present as a phrase 
and notion in the academic and political discourse on the EU for some time.1 
The claim that the EU has been able to transform political systems and 
societies through its normative power and conditionality represents one of 
the bases for labeling the EU enlargement policy as the “most successful EU 
foreign policy”.2 While this could be convincingly argued in the case of 
Central and Eastern European countries and their membership in the EU, 
nowadays it seems that the EU enlargement policy has been the victim of its 
own “success”. Not only has this success been diluted and relativized in light 
of the ongoing problems in these countries after their accession, especially 
lately with the rule of law, but also through the very mixed results of the 
enlargement policy in Western Balkans (WB). An increasing number of 
voices have questioned the effect of EU conditionality in the latter case, as 
these mixed results are becoming more visible on the ground.3 Besides the 
internal problems which WB countries have been facing, this is also due to 
the lack of consensus among the EU member states on enlargement, which 
 
1  See: Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power (Palgrave Macmillan 2006); 
Tanja A. Börzel, The transformative power of Europe reloaded: the limits of external 
Europeanization (KFG Working Paper Series, 11, 2010), Berlin: Freie Universität 
Berlin, FB Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Otto-Suhr-Institut für 
Politikwissenschaft Kolleg-Forschergruppe “The Transformative Power of Europe”, 
online at: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/36800; and Cristophe 
Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy (SIEPS 2010:6). 
2  Cristophe Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy 
(SIEPS 2010;6). 
3  See for instance, Florian Bieber (ed), EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans 
(Routledge 2017); Jelena Džankić, Soeren Keil and Marko Kmezić (eds), The 
Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A Failure of EU Conditionality? (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2019). 
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has led to certain disengagement of the EU with the WB and reduced the 
appeal of integration. Therefore, it could be argued that the 
(re)nationalization of EU enlargement policy has caused inconsistencies and 
damaged the EU’s credibility in this sense.4  
The renowned quote from the Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans summit in 
2003, which resonated strongly in the region, that “the future of Balkans is 
within the European Union”5, has lost much of its strength as membership, 
the “golden carrot”, seems ever more distant. Even though the European 
perspective for the WB has been made more “credible” by the European 
Commission in 20186, the messages sent remain rather ambiguous. Absent 
the “golden carrot”, the EU is losing its leverage and conditionality is 
noticeably weakened. 
The efforts of the EU to maintain the impression of continuous engagement 
with the region have been perceived as focusing more on stability than 
democratic consolidation, thus creating justifications for the slow pace or 
even stalemate in the integration process in the WB. The “stabilocracy” 
approach has significantly hindered efforts towards accomplishing 
sustainable reforms in the region. The peak of the migrant crisis is behind us 
now, while the Brexit saga is reaching its final stages, and the EU still cannot 
prove it is capable of dealing with more than two or three major issues. This 
is why it is high time for the EU to demonstrate its true commitment and act 
as a genuine transformative power in the WB. The EU’s leverage and 
credibility is currently seriously tested, especially in the case of one country, 
North Macedonia.  
North Macedonia was the first country from the WB region to sign the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001, even before Croatia. It 
applied for EU membership already in 2004. In 2005, North Macedonia 
 
4  Cristophe Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy 
(SIEPS 2010;16). 
5  See the Declaration, online at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-
163_en.htm. 
6  European Commission, A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU 
Engagement with the Western Balkans, February 6, 2018, online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-
enlargement-perspectivewestern-balkans_en.pdf. 
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became a candidate country for EU membership and in 2009 received its first 
recommendation from the European Commission for the start of accession 
negotiations. However, just as in the case of NATO membership in 2008,7 
also in the case for accession negotiations with the EU, Greece used its veto 
to block North Macedonia from entering these processes due to the long-
standing name issue. This Greek veto has been a faithful companion of every 
single recommendation for the start of accession negotiations since, thus for 
ten years.8 The citizens of North Macedonia had hoped and expected that the 
EU and its member states would somehow pressure Greece on the name 
issue. However, not only did this not occur, but also the vetoes were used by 
some member states as a cover for their genuine objection for opening 
accession negotiations with North Macedonia. The disappointment from this 
stalemate with the EU integration created fertile ground for democratic 
decline and the re-occurrence of authoritarian tendencies under the rule of a 
coalition led by populist conservatives in North Macedonia.9 The obvious 
presence of such authoritarian tendencies have been finally recognized by 
the European Commission in its progress report in 2016 declaring a state 
capture of the institutions and key sectors of society in North Macedonia.10  
It was also through the engagement of the European Commission in North 
Macedonia that the political turmoil, which culminated in 2017, was tackled. 
The new government of North Macedonia has clearly demonstrated its 
serious commitment to turning a new page, particularly, at the regional level 
in its relations with neighboring countries. First, an agreement with Bulgaria 
on good neighborly relations was signed and then a very difficult 
 
7  Bucharest Summit Declaration – Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 
2008, paragraph 20, online at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ 
texts_8443.htm. 
8  The recommendations of the European Commission were conditional in 2015 and 
2016 due to the political crisis. 
9  More general on this in Florian Bieber, Patterns of competitive authoritarianism in 
the Western Balkans, 34 East European Politics, 2018. 
10  European Commission, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2016 Report, 
p. 8, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files 
/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_ma
cedonia.pdf. 
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compromise with Greece was reached through the so-called Prespa 
agreement11, resolving the name issue, which lasted for 25 years. However, 
the reform efforts of North Macedonia, which make this country perhaps the 
only bright spot in the region, have not been adequately recognized. As the 
decision on the start of accession negotiations has been postponed on three 
occasions, June 2018, June 2019 and October 2019.12 The “silver carrot”, the 
entry ticket into the waiting room has still not been granted. Denying a start 
of negotiations for North Macedonia would send all the wrong signals not 
only to this country, but also to the whole region.  
First, from a regional perspective, the successful resolution of longstanding 
disputes through difficult compromises in a region in which this has 
continuously been a great challenge will remain unrewarded. The 
compromise over the name issue, a truly historic one, has been perceived and 
frequently referred to as a pattern to be followed in the resolution of other 
regional disputes. However, this could not be accomplished without the 
adequate recognition of such efforts and following up on promises made in 
the process. In this manner, the leverage of the EU in other regional disputes 
is surely going to be reduced, thus once again allowing other global players, 
such as the U.S. and Russia, to have the leading role in the EU’s backyard. 
Namely, the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia as well as the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina conundrum, arguably the biggest burning issues and security 
threats in the WB, will not be resolved through this sort of weak 
conditionality. Without a more serious engagement, the EU’s interest in the 
region would certainly be undermined. Denying, once again, the start of 
accession negotiations to Macedonia would represent strong proof thereof.   
 
11  Final Agreement for The Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination 
of the Interim Accord of 1995; and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership 
between the Parties, online at: https://vlada.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/ 
spogodba-en.pdf. 
12  Council of the European Union, General Affairs Council, Council Conclusions on 
Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, 26 June 2018, p. 16; and 
Council of the European Union, General Affairs Council, Council Conclusions on 
Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, 18 June 2019, para. 38. And 
“European Concil conclusions”, 17-18 October 2019, p. 2 para. 5. 
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Second, when domestic reforms and the EU’s transformative power are 
concerned, without the “silver carrot” for North Macedonia the EU would 
not do justice to the region’s recent poster child. Namely, North Macedonia 
has throughout this time kept a high level of support for the EU and the 
integrative processes; even if it has slightly decreased in the past couple of 
year. 13  Therefore there has always been an expectation from the 
governments to bring the country closer to membership. In this sense, the 
reforms never really totally stopped, with the exception of 2015 and 2016, 
but only changing pace during the ten years’ stalemate in the integration 
process. With the country’s new government, domestic reforms have been 
once again intensified and this has been noted by the European Commission. 
As a matter of fact, according to the Commission’s most recent progress 
reports, when it comes to the priority reform areas, also known as 
fundamentals, North Macedonia stands better than any of the other candidate 
countries from the WB. It stands even better than Montenegro and Serbia, 
which started accession negotiations in 2012 and 2014 respectively. 14 
Accordingly, by ignoring the merits and not awarding accession negotiations 
the EU will demonstrate the clear existence of double standards, instead of a 
constructive competition, in the case of WB countries, which would 
definitely lead to disappointment. North Macedonia has already experienced 
the grave consequences of an earlier disappointment, thus a negative 
scenario from such a decision is very much feasible. 
The EU stands at an important crossroad of its development, which requires 
the urgent need of reconfiguring itself amidst ongoing crises. Some member 
states, such as France, are strongly pushing for reforms of the EU itself. 
However, by leaving out the WB from the clear path of integrative processes 
the EU would only create another crisis, which would surely detract it from 
internal reforms. The EU needs to demonstrate the capacity to deal with 
 
13  Ivan Damjanovski and Marie Jelenka Kirchner, Analysis of public opinion on 
Macedonia’s accession to the European Union (2014-2018), Public Opinion Analysis 
Paper No. 1/2019, (IDSCS, KAS February 2019). 
14  European Stability Initiative, How Are They Doing in 2019? European Commission 
assessments of Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Albania (May 2019), 
online at https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20How%20are%20they%20 
doing%20-%20deciding%20on%20merit%20-%20May%202019.pdf. 
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several challenges at the same time. The next enlargement of the EU is 
almost definitely not going to occur in the mandate of the upcoming 
Commission and that leaves enough time for reflections and decisions on the 
future path of the EU. Neither the granting of accession negotiations with 
North Macedonia means a swift enlargement, nor should it be used as a 
bargaining chip in internal debates - as the stakes are much higher. After all, 
the WB stands as a small island on the European continent surrounded by 
EU member states. Hence, one should speak more of a reunification15 or 
completion16 instead of an enlargement of the EU since the external borders 
of the Union would not be changed. Completing the EU seems like a priority 
that should be placed high on the list. 
 
15  Remarks by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the 
informal meeting of EU Foreign Ministers (Gymnich), 30 August 2019: “I personally 
believe that the enlargement process, when it comes to the Western Balkans, has two 
specific elements issues. One is that the enlargement is not in that case a proper 
enlargement: geographically it is a reunification because all the Western Balkan 
countries are neighbouring EU Member States, it is an island in-between the 
European Union. So, it is not an enlargement it is a reunification of the continent”, 
online at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/66820/ 
remarks-hrvp-federica-mogherini-press-conference-following-informal-meeting-eu-
foreign_en. 
16  Remarks by Foreign Minister of North Macedonia Nikola Dimitrov, Helsinki 30 
August 2019, online at: https://mia.mk/2019/08/fm-dimitrov-france-and-the-
balkans-are-fighting-for-the-same-values/?lang=en. 
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Flandra Syla 
EU Enlargement Agenda toward Western 
Balkans – The Case of Kosovo 
Across Western Balkans, public sentiment has it that, as a rule of thumb, the 
EU deals with the region only retroactively and mainly when a crisis 
emerges. Such sentiments are directly fueled by a track record of constant 
de-prioritization of enlargement in favor of other, arguably, more pressing 
issues on the EU end. While it is true that the EU has been in the center of 
troubling occurrences such as the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 refuge 
crisis, and finally Brexit, it is arguable that enlargement was so mutually-
exclusive with regard to these events that it had to be practically dropped 
altogether. 
In such a context, the enlargement agenda was largely carried out on an ad-
hoc basis, lacking a clear-cut vision and a focused strategy, thus leaving the 
region in a risky limbo. For illustration, there are fifteen years in between the 
2018 enlargement strategy and what might be considered a previous event of 
equivalent magnitude, namely the 2003 EU-Western Balkans Summit in 
Thessaloniki. 1  Looking at the case of Kosovo specifically, despite 
undergoing tremendous changes in between these two events – from UN-
administered territory to independent country recognized by the majority of 
the EU member states – progress on the European path has been fairly 
unimpressive. 
Despite the EU’s consistency in officially reiterating that Kosovo has a clear 
European perspective as part of the Western Balkans, tangible progress in 
the country’s accession path has only been scarce. Kosovo’s integration 
agenda is trapped somewhere between the strains emerging from the EU-
facilitated dialogue on the normalization of relations with Serbia, the heavy 
 
1  EU-Western Balkans Summit, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003. Online at: 
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm. 
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burden of not being recognized by five EU member states, and the country’s 
own multi-facet troubles with nation-building, rule of law, economic 
reforms, and democratization.  
In 2018, in what accounts as the most substantial commitment toward 
Western Balkans in recent years, the EU laid out a revised strategic approach 
for the integration of the group of six remaining countries: Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. 
The document, officially entitled “A credible enlargement perspective for an 
enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans”, hereby referred to as 
the EU enlargement strategy, gave rise to new hopes that the enlargement 
fatigue and the consecutive crises that had been hitting the EU from all sides 
were finally fading in favor of a renewed commitment toward Western 
Balkans. While it is arguable that what the strategy entails verbally is 
mirrored by a proportional commitment in terms of implementation, the 
document includes to considerable positive outcomes, specifically for 
countries such as Montenegro and Serbia, for which accession timelines are 
laid out. Rather regrettably, for Kosovo the document lays out not much 
more than a manual for standstill.  
The first significant contractual relationship between Kosovo and the EU, 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA),2 was signed in 2015 
and entered into force in 2016. The signing of this agreement is a historic 
event in EU-Kosovo relations, not only insofar as it marks the first legally-
binding contractual relationship between the two, but also because the SAA 
offers Kosovo the chance to seize numerous opportunities, which by making 
the country more compatible to the EU would also fundamentally transform 
it. Kosovo is offered a ten year framework to meet the reforms and carry out 
the work prescribed in the document. However, for Kosovans the concerning 
issue is that even if every criteria is dutifully fulfilled, there are only vague 
assumptions regarding the epilogue. As far as the SAA is concerned, EU 
officials admit that the only issue they are open to discuss is its 
 
2  The SAA document signed between Kosovo and the EU. Online at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1476698477996&uri=CELEX%3A220 
16A0316%2801%29. 
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implementation; projections about how exactly the completion of the SAA 
would materialize in Kosovo’s accession ambition are practically off the 
table.3 The EU enlargement strategy on the other hand also fails to bear any 
tangible projections regarding the plausibility and modalities of the country’s 
accession. The strategy labels Kosovo as a “potential candidate” whose focus 
should be in the implementation of the SAA, whereas advancements on its 
European path shall occur once circumstances allow.4 Under the lines of the 
overwhelmingly ambiguous EU language lay the real issues: the five non-
recognizers, the tensioned and politically unpredictable dialogue with 
Serbia, and last and – this time – ironically least Kosovo’s internal capability 
to carry the necessary reforms.  
In pushing forth such, ambitious agendas, which EU integration is, the 
prevalence of a sound mix of requirements and incentives is incremental for 
success in the long run. In the case of Kosovo, where the former currently 
outweigh the later, the perspectives are not on the upside spectrum. Yes, the 
obedient and efficient ticking of the criteria box does foremost benefit 
Kosovo itself, and again yes, seizing the economic, commercial and cultural 
opportunities that the SAA entails goes also to Kosovo’s credit. However, 
carrying such complex and all-encompassing reforms is a heavy burden for 
a fragile country with scarce capacities. If this heavy burden is not met by 
equally high stakes, chances are grim we will speak of progress. Here is what 
the EU needs to take into account. 
First, concerning the group of the five non-recognizers, the EU should not 
be satisfied by the status-quo of merely restating the obvious that the 
recognition of independence is a national matter of the specific member 
states. Instead, there should be a proactive and genuine commitment toward 
finding middle ground and generating creative solutions. After all, state 
positions are fluid and subject to change. Exemplary to this is the fact that in 
 
3  Augustin Palokaj and Gjeraqina Tuhina, The Upshot of the SAA: Kosovo-EU 
Relations, 2016, p. 9. Online at: http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/MSA-
ENG_TEXT-2.compressed.pdf. 
4  European Commission, A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU 
engagement with the Western Balkan, 6 February 2018, p.2. Online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-
enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf. 
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a few years’ time, four out of the five member states that do not recognize 
Kosovo have moved on to recognize Kosovo passports.5  For the global 
diplomatic player that it ought to be, the EU should be able to gravitate with 
more confidence into Western Balkans perplexities. For example, if the five 
non-recognizers remain decided in blocking Kosovo’s accession, there is 
nothing that derails the remaining twenty-three from conditioning Serbia’s 
accession to the Kosovo issue. 
Second, the EU possesses many powerful tools which it can leverage, of 
which primarily the Brussels-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and 
Serbia. To evoke some context, in 2011, after years of frozen relations, 
Kosovo and Serbia began a “technical dialogue” to normalize them. In 2013, 
the EU-led dialogue resulted in the first agreement between the two parties. 
Among others, the document known as the “Brussels Agreement” made 
Kosovo and Serbia party to a commitment not to “block, or encourage others 
to block, the other side's progress in the respective EU paths”.6 Under the 
current light, especially after the publication of the new EU enlargement 
strategy, the ongoing dialogue embodies renewed significance for the 
respective European paths of the two countries. Indeed, while Kosovo also 
seeks to use the dialogue to secure jurisdiction over the entire territory, 
especially the Serb-majority municipalities of the north, it is fair to say that 
Serbia is part of the dialogue primarily because of its EU aspirations. Despite 
the EU officially holding that “Accession is and will remain a merit-based 
process fully dependent on the objective progress achieved by each 
country”,7 on the negotiation table, Serbia clearly has a head start in that it is 
the country that the EU wants to win/ integrate more urgently.  
For Kosovo, there is a general lack of clarity and causal relationship between 
dialogue requirements and advancements in the accession path. Moreover, 
 
5  Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia recognize passports issued by the Republic 
of Kosovo despite not recognizing Kosovo as an independent state. 
6  First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations – EU press 
release. Online at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-347_en.htm. 
7  A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the 
Western Balkan, 6 February 2018, p.2. Online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/ beta-political/files/communication-credible-
enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf. 
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despite the dialogue being integrated within the framework for the accession 
negotiations with Serbia, and into the SAA for Kosovo, the principal burden 
seems to be on the latter. While for Serbia there is a clear integration 
pathway, for Kosovo, despite dialogue outcomes and potential fulfilment of 
SAA criteria, the same is missing. The state of affairs is so that “despite the 
conditionality of the normalization of relations being common to both Serbia 
and Kosovo and the Dialogue facing hindrances, Serbia’s prospects keep 
advancing whereas Kosovo’s remain at a stalemate”.8 By failing to properly 
and fully seize the opportunity at hand – namely, a singular conditioning tool 
applied equally to both parties – the EU is sending the wrong signal and 
compromising the process in the long run. If Kosovo’s vulnerability deriving 
out of non-complete recognition is exploited to quell fears of losing Serbia 
(again) to other, non-Western influences, then, time and again, what ought 
to be a merit-based process will be jeopardized by geopolitics. The EU must 
tie the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue to the enlargement strategy in ways that 
recognize, encourage and reward commitment, openness to compromise, and 
the capacity to implement and enforce signed agreements, and equally point 
out and penalize the failure to do so.  
Third, in asking Kosovo, or for that matter any other country, to be a reliable 
partner, the EU must lead by example. There is a general public sentiment 
that the EU has failed Kosovo. Unfortunately, that is not merely tied to the 
integration agenda. The EU’s involvement in the nation-building process, 
most evidently through its law enforcement mission EULEX – the largest 
ever in EU history – has had a not-so-positive record. Cumulatively, the 
voice of the EU has started to lose its echo, and Kosovo’s faith in the 
integration process is trembling. Lucrative economic opportunities aside, 
why should Kosovo commit to the EU agenda and believe in accession 
prospects when the track-record, especially related to visa liberalization 
shows that despite fulfilling all criteria and meeting twice as many conditions 
 
8  Linking the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue to the EU Enlargement Strategy, 2019, p. 14. 
Online at: http://www.legalpoliticalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GLPS-
Linking-the-Kosovo-Serbia-Dialogue-to-the-EU-Enlargement-Strategy.pdf. 
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as other countries9 the process was endlessly prolonged. Despite being the 
most pro-EU of all six Western Balkans countries,10 Kosovo has been kept 
isolated the longest and without substantive objective reasoning. 
Indeed, this brings us back to the principle of proportionality in mixing 
requirements with incentives. Instead of customary proclamations of interest 
in the country, the EU must strictly relate the fulfillment of criteria to specific 
steps in the accession path. But to do so, a clear accession path needs to be 
laid out in the first place. Important questions such as what happens when 
the SAA is completely implemented or what are the practical gains from 
constructive engagement in the dialogue with Serbia cannot be sidelined for 
much longer. It is high time that Kosovo not simply be cursorily mentioned 
in enlargement talks, but also that the country’s European perspective is 
translated into an accession roadmap with precise and measurable steps. 
Finally, Kosovo faces manifold internal challenges: rule of law is weak, 
corruption is high and the economy is in a deadlock. The European 
integration agenda represents a unique opportunity to advance these matters 
and boost democratization further. The European presence is heavily felt in 
all hallmarks of life and Kosovans embody in the EU the authoritative friend 
with whom their fate is intertwined. For Kosovo, there is no alternative to 
European integration. That being said, the EU must not regard this as 
something to take for granted. Nor should it see Kosovo’s lack of alternatives 
at face value. Instead, the EU must deal with Kosovo in good faith and make 
the case for a reliable, long-standing partnership. Kosovo has a young, 
dynamic and thriving population whose Euro-enthusiasm is unmatched. The 
EU must use the enlargement framework to seize and channel this 
enthusiasm, not dishearten and jeopardize it.  
 
9  Roadmap of Visa Liberalization with Kosovo. Online at: https://eeas.europa. 
eu/sites/eeas/files/visa_liberalisation_with_kosovo_roadmap.pdf. 
10  Balkan Public Barometer. Online at: https://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/balkan-
public-barometer. 
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